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‘Widening a European Dialogue in Moldova’





Focus Groups (FGs), conducted in Moldova between 28 March and 11 April
2014, represent the second stage in the assessment of public attitudes
towards the European Union (EU), the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP),
Russia and the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). They followed a nation-
wide representative survey undertaken in October-November 20131, to
enable an individual-level response and more in-depth investigation of
some of the key issues raised by the survey.
The outcomes of focus groups reveal the following trends in the attitudes of the
respondents:
• Despite a slight decline in public interest and support for the EU, registered by
the survey, the individual-level responses of focus groups display signs of the
ongoing internalisation of the EU narratives into public behaviour and attitudes
• Through their comments, FG respondents also exhibit an increasing urge and
urgency to focus on rebuilding Moldova’s state capacity to make it a strong,
independent, stable, functional and self-respected nation, and a ‘home’ for its
citizens to harness emigration
• In congruence with the survey’s findings, Moldovan respondents experience an
actualising sense of rivalry between the two regional projects – the EaP and the
ECU – and express a growing concern about the prospect for constructive
dialogue between the EU and Russia and its implications for the eastern
neighbourhood
3www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
Thematic Block I: Moldova and the World
• The European direction is now decisively regarded as part of Moldova’s national
interest and strongly associated with ‘ living better and facing the future with more
confidence’
• There is also a growing demand for more domestic stability, more effective government
and more balanced neighbourly relations with all interested parties
• Transdniestria is no longer seen as an obstacle to Moldova’s European integration
Thematic Block II: Moldova-EU relations under the EaP
• Respondents believe that they are perceived in Europe as ‘second-rated’, poor and
underdeveloped. At the same time, they feel they are important for the EU, being almost
‘the only state in the region favourable to the EU’
• Respondents feel they can trust the EU, and that the EU in return, has trust in Moldova
• There is an increasing congruence in public perceptions of what the EU does for
Moldova and what people really need, neatly expressed in the phrase ‘I really feel
change, in education, in justice and in our lives’
Thematic Block III: Moldova-Russia relations, including perceptions of/attitudes
to the ECU
• Respondents feel they are often treated in a derogatory and abrasive manner in
Russia, often being referred to as ‘dirty people’
• Many indicated no sense of trust in Russia-Moldovan relations, with the latter being
viewed as relations of subordination and compliance
• The ECU and Russia are regarded as important and accessible suppliers of energy and
goods, but also as a source of political pressure, poverty and instability
• Respondents felt split between the two regional alternatives – the EaP and the ECU –
and strongly preferred, at least in the short term, more balanced relations with
neighbours, including Russia
• Most important lessons learned from the Crimea and Ukraine include the need for
better communication, more information and effective government, to assure stability
1 For more information on the survey results visit www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/research/documents/gec-moldova-survey-brief-2014.pdf
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Moldova and the World
Despite a slight decline in public
interest and support for the EU
registered by the 2013 nation-wide
representative survey, the individual-
level responses of  focus groups
display reassuring patterns of  the
ongoing internalisation of  the EU
narratives into the public set of  mind
in Moldova.
In particular, when discussing their
country’s foreign policy priorities as
well as most pressing needs and
public interests, the respondents
seem to have fallen into two major
categories:
1 those feeling fully committed to
the European course: ‘I
personally see the light at the end
of the tunnel, and that light is the
EU. I see achievements, decent
living, prosperity for our youth
without being forced by
circumstances to abandon their
homes for income’; and
2 those feeling European, but
prioritising Moldova’s
independence and interests,
which they see in rebuilding its
state capacity for a strong and
self-respected nation, and which
would have peaceful and stable
relations with all the neighbours,
including Russia, for the benefit
of  all.
Either group felt that stability and
order were of  priority, which should
be reinforced by the narratives of
success and more information on
the current and future directions
from their government.
All respondents indicated that they
wanted to see healthy and balanced
relations with all their neighbours,
and especially with Russia and
Ukraine, while anticipating the
development of  closer ties with
Europe. Many also expressed a
growing sense of  affinity with the
European nations, especially with
Romania and Germany. No
respondent referred to the ECU as a
foreign policy priority. At the same
time, a sense of  acute ambivalence
prevailed when juxtaposing the EU
and Russia. Respondents felt they
had limited information to fully
commit to their European future and
feared it would come at a great
personal cost and insecurity. They
also insisted on the need to have a
good working relationship with both
power centres, and loathed having
to choose between them: ‘we need
stability, safety and welfare, with all
our neighbours’; ‘being one-sided
would be detrimental for Moldova’.
They valued Russia as a jobs,
goods and trade market, while the
EU – as an attractive but still a
distant future. When pressed further,
however, in the majority, they felt they
would prioritise the EU, because of
its higher living standards,
advancement, work opportunities,
different (more positive) attitude,
transparency, continuing support,
and also because the EU had




6 Global Europe Centre Survey Brief
All respondents agreed that the EU
and Russia would struggle to
cooperate in the future over the
neighbourhood, and Ukraine serves
as a testimony to Russia’s
obstructive behaviour. The most
desirable outcome for Moldova
however would be a constructive
dialogue with the two unions: ‘Now it
is impossible to be with two unions…
But ideally, we would like to live with
both – the EU and Russia’.
To resolve the dilemma of  choice,
many respondents felt that
prioritisation of  domestic reforms –
to build a strong and respected
nation – was imperative. This
indicates a shift in public attitudes
from their excessive reliance on EU
guidance, as registered by the 2009
FGs, to a growing sense of  self-
awareness and realisation of  the
need to be independent and
esteemed. Hence, many
interviewees contended that
fostering a more visible and
effective government would be of
great importance: ‘There is a
president, but we do not see him’;
‘there should be more stability as
well as clarity of  direction’; ‘there
should be better communication on
why and what’; ‘we should be
rebuilding Moldova: when we are
strong we are respected’. Owing to
the lack of  information and regular
communication campaigns, people
felt ‘unwanted’ and ‘removed from
making decisions’, and that the
government interests were ‘not




Finally, Transdniestria (TMR) was no
longer seen as an obstacle to
further European integration.
Respondents felt that TMR became
too different to them. They also felt it
proved it could survive
independently from Moldova, and
many believed the government
should ‘let it go’.
In summary, although increasingly
pro-European in their behaviour and
attitudes, Moldovans felt that
prioritising good neighbourly
relations, with Russia inclusive, and
building a strong nation, to become
a home for its citizens once more,
are imperative and urgent tasks to
achieve for their government.
Thematic Block II: 
EU-Moldova relations
under the EaP
A trend for critical self-assessment
detected in public attitudes by the
2013 survey, seems to continue at
the individual level of  focus groups.
In particular, respondents felt that
‘the EU does not yet see us as a
nation’: ‘we are still perceived as
part of  the FSU or Russia’; as a
‘second-rated, poor and inferior
nation’, ‘they see us as retarded,
we’ve got low economic and cultural
levels of  development’, and ‘the
truth is they don’t know Moldova,
and our location’. Respondents also
commented that often ‘living beyond
our means and having all these
luxurious cars and mansions in the
disposal of  our politicians’ may
send the wrong signal to Europe.
Only a handful of  respondents
mentioned corruption as an
endemic problem of  the state.
7At the same time, there are some
signs for more positive appraisal
and self-perception: ‘I think the EU
believe we are honest and good-
hearted nation, they like our cuisine,
and appreciate our culture’; and
‘they see us as hard-working and
willing to study’; ‘they trust us and
willing to cooperate. We are now
treated with respect’. Respondents
also increasingly believe Moldova
is too important for Europe being
almost ‘the only state in the region
remaining strongly in favour of  the
EU’. This perception is further
reinforced by a sense of  trust
between the EU and Moldova:
‘We trust the EU because they
really support us, and we now
see some real benefits’; ‘They
certainly have confidence in us,
which we’ve now earned’.
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
There is an increasing congruence
in public perceptions of  what the EU
does for Moldova, and what people
really need. The respondents
believe the EU could help to
improve governance especially
when implementing reforms,
infrastructure, legal system, quality
of  life, human rights protection, and
more generally, to help with strategic
development and instil a new way of
thinking, while ‘we could do all the
rest ourselves’. These fully
corresponded to interviewees’ call
for better education, more stability,
more effective governance, and
rebuilding infrastructure at home, to
offer permanent jobs and wages.
Education, water projects,
agriculture, business, technologies
were identified as success stories of
the EU-Moldova cooperation. 
As one respondent commented:
‘I really could feel changes: reforms
are slow, fighting with corruption
and for quality. But you could now
see villages with schools, and
nurseries; improving justice and
health systems; proper water
supplies for rural communities,
and much more!’
At the same time, the normative
differences registered by the 2009
and 2013 surveys, continue to
persist. A set of  values specifically
identified as different from
European, include family
connections (also referring to
extended family lodging), religion,
traditions, spirituality, emotiveness,
dressing, manners and ‘mentality’
more broadly. The differences are
observed even in daily practices:
‘I noticed they cut bread very thinly;
whereas we prefer quantity’. These
differences are not seen as an
obstacle to further integration, rather
as a signature of  the Moldovan
people, who are open to shared
learning: ‘our customs and traditions
are by no means an impediment for
cultural dialogue! We can learn a lot
from each other, and there are also
notions of  universal values, which
we all should respect’. Many agreed
that the best ways to accommodate






of/attitudes to the Eurasian
Customs Union (ECU)
Respondents convey strong
preference for more balanced
relations with all neighbours,
including Russia. The differences in
narratives towards both power
centres become more apparent
when respondents are pressed to
choose between the two, as well as
describe their attitudes to both the
EU and Russia.
Many respondents observe strong
historical connections and collective
memories with Russia, premised on
the language, cultural traditions and
its accessibility. At the same time,
many also note differences in
attitudes when compared to the EU:
‘Russia still sees us as part of  the
FSU, and by default, part of  Russia’;
‘Moldovans for them are associated
with “dirty people”, “beggers”’; ‘they
treat us as migrant workers, with no
rights or equality’; ‘they look down
on us, and treat us as second-class
citizens’; ‘they see us as parasites
which cause problems’; ‘we are not
treated as an independent nation,
we are Russia’s extension, we are
dependants’. Only very occasionally,
a positive comment emerged
suggesting that ‘Russia knows us
well, we shared history with them,
they know we are just the
‘Gastarbeiters’ for them’. 
The differentiating factor between
the EU and Russia, in the
perceptions of  respondents,
seems to be a degree of  ‘familiarity’:
while the EU may not know
Moldovans well enough and hence
treat them cautiously; Russia knows
Moldovans too well, and treats
them derogatively.
Moldovans remain positive about
the EU membership perspective.
They do not anticipate it soon, but
contend that it would only be
natural, when reforms are
implemented. Major obstacles to
closer integration are seen in
excessive bureaucracy (‘too many
chiefs’), corruption, indifference and
hypocrisy, and the lack of  political
will.
In summary, FG results conveyed a
positive sense of  commitment to
Europe as a project. Although
displaying a fair share of  self-
criticism, respondents nevertheless
remained positive about their future,
and how they are now being
represented/ perceived in Europe –
as a hard-working nation, which
could be trusted – which together
with the emphasis on rebuilding the
state, as their home, thrust a
reassuring outlook onto the future.
Furthermore, although cultural
differences were explicitly noted,
many believed there was room for
shared learning as well as
cohabitation in diversity.





‘Why can’t they leave us for ever in
peace??’, especially that ‘our
economic relations are not
functioning at all, mainly because of
Russia’s unfair treatment and
regular embargoes’.
Although in the 2013 many
respondents expressed their
awareness of the ECU and
appreciation of the prospect for
collaboration, the FGs, however,
conveyed a sense of dividedness
vis-à-vis developing closer relations
with the ECU: ‘taking jobs there –
yes; but not at the expense of
freedom’; ‘I can’t see a Single
Economic Space happening any
time soon, like anything else in
Russia’. Many noted that the younger
generation is now strongly committed
to Europe, and ‘the government
should seek compromise to develop
healthy relations with ECU, but not at
the expense of the EU’. Interestingly,
although many common cultural
features were identified between
Moldovans and Russians, including
Orthodox faith, language, traditions
and even a set of mind; a stronger
cultural affinity has now been
displayed with Europe, even if  in
rhetoric only.
Most important lessons learned from
the Crimea and Ukraine included the
need for better communication, more
information and effective
government, to assure stability.
In conclusion, although the 2013
survey registered some erosion of
national identity amongst the
Moldovans, and also their dwindling
interest in the EU, the FG results
seem to challenge the picture. 
At an individual level, the FG
respondents displayed a firm sense
of commitment to the European
future, and gradual internalisation of





opinion may be divided with regards
to immediate economic benefits,
preferences and market accessibility
of both regional projects – the EaP
and the ECU – there was no doubt
amongst the FG participants, that
cooperation with the EU offered a
more stable outlook into the future.
More communication from the
government, more information about
the EU, and more tangible reforms
are needed, to forge preferences
into commitments, and promises into
real incentives.
All respondents commented on low
levels of  trust between the two
countries: ‘There is no, and never
has been. There is only
subordination and compliance’.
Nevertheless, respondents view
Russia as an important source for
their economic stability, in terms of
providing gas and oil supplies, and
also serving as a market to sell their
goods, and agricultural proceeds.
That said, Russia is also seen as a
source of  anxiety, insecurity and
poverty: ‘Poverty in Russia is greater
than ours, and they only pretend
they help to reform…’; ‘Russia will
never help Moldova’; ‘They might
help with Transdniestria, because
Putin is clever, but only if  they
wanted to’. More often respondents
note their sense of  remorse, and
dependency on Russia, and look
forward to rebuilding themselves as
a nation to withstand the pressure:
10
experience with the EU integration









The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is
a new research centre at the
University of  Kent focusing on
Europe, its member states, and its
place in a changing world. The
Centre brings together leading
international academics from
politics and international relations,
economics, law, business, and
European culture in order to explore
the contemporary policy challenges
to Europe and its nation states.
The GEC is based within the School
of  Politics and International
Relations (SPIR) and at the Brussels
School of  International Studies




The Independent Sociology and
Information Service (ISIS) ‘OPINIA’,
founded in 1992 as a branch of  the
All-Union Public Opinion Research
Centre (WCIOM), is the 1st
sociological service in the Republic
of  Moldova, specialising in public
opinion, political, social and
marketing research. It is a member
of the ‘Scientific Cooperation of
Research Institutions in the CIS
region’ consortium since 2000; and
member of  the European Centre for
Social Studies since 2005. Over the
years it conducted numerous
international projects, including
‘EU partnership-building approach
with Eastern Europe’ (Aberystwyth
University, UK); ‘Social Capital and
Democracy’ (Aberdeen University,
UK); ‘Youth Transition Studies’
(INTAS), ‘Patterns of  migration’
(INTAS), etc.
Director of ISIS ‘OPINIA’
Dr Olga Danii
E: office@opinia.md
T: +373 22 23 74 35
Slovak Atlantic
Commission (SAC):
The Slovak Atlantic Commission
(SAC), based in Bratislava, Slovakia
is an independent, non-partisan,
non-governmental organization that
has been giving Central Europe a
powerful voice in the foreign policy
debate for the past two decades.




regional, European and transatlantic
cooperation on the basis of
instrumental values, particularly
democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of  law.
‘Widening the European Dialogue
in Moldova’ project (SAMRS
2013/VP/01/19), implemented by the
SAC with the assistance of  its think-
tank, the Central European Policy
Institute (CEPI), has the ambition to
contribute to the efforts aimed at
increasing public support for EU
integration in Moldova, particularly
utilizing Central Europe’s recent
Professor Elena A Korosteleva (Principal Investigator)
is Director of the Global Europe Centre (Professional
Studies), Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the
University of Kent, and a Visiting Professorial Fellow at
the Belarusian State University. Elena’s main research
interests include EU foreign policies, European
External Action Service, European Neighbourhood
Policy and Eastern Partnership, EU governance,
democracy promotion and the concepts of democracy.
Global Europe Centre Survey Brief
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in the Northern Region (2 FGs) –
municipality Balti and village
Corlateni (county Rascani) and in the
Southern Region (2 FGs) – city
Causeni and village Chirsova (ATU
Gagauzia).
The questionnaire included three
thematic blocks addressing public
perceptions, behavioural patterns
and levels of  awareness about
i Moldova in the World
ii Moldova-EU relations under the
Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP)
iii Moldova-Russia relations
including public perceptions of
the Eurasian Customs Union
(ECU)
The findings are cross-compared
with the surveys undertaken by the
Principal Investigator in 2013, and
20093, as well as other available
data, including the EU
Neighbourhood Barometer East
(Autumn 2012).
Documents available on request for
further inspection:
• Analytical report of  the FGs
• Instructions for moderators;
screening questionnaire
• Questionnaire in English, Russian
and Romanian languages
• Technical report of  the FGs
• Transcripts of  individual FGs
Focus groups on average lasted up
to 2 hours and were video- and
audio-recorded, using local
languages for interlocution. They
comprised of 8-9 participants each
of whom were sampled using a
snowballing method and a screening
questionnaire. Individual groups were
of mixed origin, broken down by
gender, age and education.
Geographically, focus groups were
conducted in the Central Region
(2 FGs) – municipality Chisinau and
village Balabanesti (county Criuleni),
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
Six focus group discussions were carried out by
Independent Sociological and Information Service
‘OPINIA’, between 28 March and 11 April 2014, as
part of the wider research project titled ‘Widening
the European Dialogue in Moldova’, under the
research leadership of Professor E Korosteleva
(GEC) and administrative and financial management
of M Skala (SAC).
MOLDOVA’S VALUES SURVEY:
A TECHNICAL REPORT2
2 This survey is commissioned by the Slovak
Atlantic Commission, under the leadership of
Michal Skala, MA, for the project ‘Widening
the European Dialogue in Moldova’ (SAMRS
2013/VP/01/19) financially supported by
SlovakAid. The findings are the copyright of
the University of Kent: Please cite accordingly.
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